In this paper we define a new family of rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems related with Kruskal's algorithm. We characterize this family with a cost monotonicity property and a cost additivity property. Adding the property of core selection (or separability) to the previous characterization, we obtain the family of obligation rules defined in Tijs et al (2006) .
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Introduction
A group of agents want some particular service which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost. They do not care whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source. These kind of situations are studied in minimum cost spanning tree problems, briefly mcstp. Formally, an mcstp is characterized by a set N ∪ {0} and a matrix C. N is the set of agents, 0 is the source, and for each i, j ∈ N ∪ {0} , c ij denotes the cost of connecting i and j. Many real situations can be modeled in this way. For instance communication networks, such as telephone, Internet, wireless telecommunication, or cable television.
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A relevant issue of this literature is to define algorithms for constructing minimum cost spanning trees, briefly mt. Kruskal (1956) provides an algorithm for finding mt. Another relevant issue is how to allocate the cost associated with the mt among agents. Bird (1976) , Feltkamp et al (1994) , Kar (2002) , Dutta and Kar (2004) , and Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) study several rules. In this case, one of the most important topics is the axiomatic characterization of the rules. The idea is to propose desirable properties and find out which of them characterize every rule. Properties often help agents to compare different rules and to decide which rule is preferred for a particular situation.
A dual approach is to study what rules satisfying a set of properties are. This is the approach followed in this paper. We focus, mainly, on two properties over the cost matrix: an additivity property called Restricted Additivity (RA) , and a monotonicity property called Strong Cost Monotonicity (SCM ).
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006b) introduce RA. They prove that no rule satisfies additivity over all mcstp. The reason is that a rule must divide the cost of an mt among agents. Thus, they say that a rule f satisfies RA when f (C + C 0 ) = f (C)+f (C 0 ) for each pair of "similar" problems C and C 0 . Similar problems means that there exists at least one mt in C and C 0 satisfying that if we order the arcs of the mt by increasing costs in C and C 0 , then we can obtain the same order in C and C 0 . Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) introduce SCM. This property says that if C ≥ C 0 , then f (C) ≥ f (C 0 ) . SCM implies that if a number of connection costs increase and the rest of connection costs (if any) remain the same, no agent can be better off. SCM demands agents' contribution to move in the same direction irrespective of their locations on minimum cost spanning trees.
Our main result characterizes the set of rules satisfying RA and SCM. We prove that these rules are closely related with Kruskal's algorithm. The idea behind these rules is the following. At each step of the algorithm, an arc is added to the network. Once we add the arc, we divide its cost among the agents. Let be a function, specifying the part of the cost paid by each agent. Each agent, will pay the sum of the costs paid in each arc, selected by Kruskal's algorithm. The function must satisfy two properties. First, the way in which divides the cost of an arc, can only depend on the connected components of the network before the arc is added, and the connected components of the network after the arc is added. Second, must satisfy a path independence property. Assume, that we have two networks with the same set of connected components. We add to both networks two sequences of arcs, such that, the sets of connected components of the new networks also coincide. The path independence condition says, that the total part of the cost paid by an agent in both sequences is the same.
Some subsets of these rules have been studied in other papers. The optimistic weighted Shapley rules, are studied in Lorenzo-Freire (2007a, 2007b) and obligation rules are studied in Moretti et al (2005) and Tijs et al (2006) Obligation rules are also defined through Kruskal's algorithm using some maps called obligation functions. An obligation function is a map assigning to each subset of agents S a vector in the simplex of R S . The part of the cost of the arcs selected by Kruskal's algorithm, that each agent has to pay, is computed through these obligation functions. We define generalized obligation functions. Following the same approach as in Tijs et al (2006) , we define generalized obligation rules. We prove that the set of generalized obligation rules, is the set of rules satisfying RA and SCM. We also consider other properties: Core Selection (CS), Separability (SEP ) , and Symmetry (SY M) . CS says that the rule is in the core of the problem. Two subsets of agents, S and N \ S, can connect to the source separately or can connect jointly. If there are no savings when they connect jointly, SEP says that agents must pay the same in both circumstances. SY M says that if two agents are symmetric (with respect to their connection costs), then they must pay the same. Using these properties and our previous result we provide characterizations of other rules. We give two characterizations of obligation rules. The first one with RA, SCM, and CS. The second one with RA, SCM, and SEP. If we add SY M to both characterizations of obligation rules we obtain the Equal Remaining Obligation rule (ERO) introduced in Feltkamp et al (1994) . This rule is studied later in Branzei et al (2004) and Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a , 2006b , 2006c .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce mcstp. In Section 3 we define the family of rules. In Section 4 we present the characterization of the family with RA and SCM. In Section 5 we prove that the family of rules can be obtained as generalized obligation rules. In Section 6 we give the charaterizations of obligation rules and ERO. In Appendix we prove the results of the paper.
Preliminaries
This section is devoted to introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems and the notation used in the paper.
Let N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite subset N ⊂ N , an order π on N is a bijection π : N −→ {1, . . . , |N |} where, for all i ∈ N , π(i) is the position of agent i. Let Π(N ) denote the set of all orders in N . Given π ∈ Π(N ), P re(i, π) denotes the set of elements of N which come before i in the order given by π, namely, P re(i, π) = {j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)}. Moreover, given π ∈ Π(N ) and S ⊂ N , let π S denote the order induced by π among agents in S.
We deal with networks whose nodes are elements of a set N 0 = N ∪ {0}, where N is the set of agents and 0 is a special node called the source. Usually we take N = {1, . . . , |N |}.
A cost matrix C = (c ij ) i,j∈N 0 represents the cost of a direct link between any pair of nodes. We assume symmetric costs, i.e., c ij = c ji ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N 0 and c ii = 0 for all i ∈ N 0 . Since c ij = c ji we will work with undirected arcs, i.e., (i, j) = (j, i).
We denote the set of all cost matrices with set of agents N as C N . Given C, C 0 ∈ C N we say that C ≤ C 0 if c ij ≤ c 0 ij for all i, j ∈ N 0 . A minimum cost spanning tree problem, more briefly referred to as an mcstp, is a pair (N 0 , C) where N ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ C N is the cost matrix. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), we denote the mcstp induced by C in S ⊂ N as (S 0 , C).
A network g over N 0 is a subset of {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N 0 , i 6 = j}. The elements of g are called arcs.
Given a network g and a pair of different nodes i and j, a path from i to j (in g) is a sequence of different arcs g ij = {(i s−1 , i s )} p s=1 that satisfies (i s−1 , i s ) ∈ g for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, i = i 0 and j = i p . We say that i, j ∈ N 0 are connected (in g) if there exists a path from i to j. A cycle is a path from i to i.
A tree is a network where, for each i, j ∈ N 0 , there is a unique path from i to j.
Given a network g, let
k=1 denote the partition of N 0 in connected components induced by g. Formally, P (g) is the only partition of N 0 satisfying the following two properties:
• If i, j ∈ S k (g), then i and j are connected in g.
• If i ∈ S k (g), j ∈ S l (g) and k 6 = l, then i and j are not connected in g. Given a network g and i ∈ N 0 , let S(P (g), i) denote the element of P (g) to which i belongs to.
We denote the set of all networks over N 0 as G N . Moreover, G N 0 denotes the set of networks over N 0 such that every agent in N is connected to the source.
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and g ∈ G N , we define the cost associated with g as
When there is no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C, g) instead of c(N 0 , C, g).
A minimum cost spanning tree for (N 0 , C), more briefly referred to as an mt, is a tree t ∈ G N 0 such that c(t) = min g∈G N 0 c(g). An mt always exists, although it does not necessarily have to be unique. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), m(N 0 , C) denotes the cost associated with any mt t in (N 0 , C).
After obtaining an mt, one of the most important issues addressed in the literature on mcstp is how to divide its associated cost m(N 0 , C) among the agents. To do it, different cost allocation rules can be considered.
A (cost allocation) rule is a map f that associates with each mcstp
Given an agent i, f i (N 0 , C) denotes its allocated cost.
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A cooperative game with transferable utility, TU game, is a pair (N, v) where N ⊂ N and v : 2 N → R satisfies that v (∅) = 0. We denote by Sh(N, v) the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the T U game (N, v). We denote by core (N, v) the core of (N, v) . Since we are allocating costs the core is defined as
Bird (1976) associates a TU game (N, v C ) with each mcstp (N 0 , C). For each coalition S ⊂ N , the value of a coalition is the cost of connecting agents in S to the source by themselves, i.e. v C (S) = m(S 0 , C). Kar (2002) studies the Shapley value of (N, v C ) and Granot and Huberman (1981) the core of (N, v C ).
The family of rules
In this section we define a family of rules associated with Kruskal's algorithm. The idea is the following. At each step of the algorithm, an arc is added to the network. Once we add the arc we divide its cost among the agents. Let be a function specifying the part of the cost paid by each agent. Each agent will pay the sum of the costs paid in each arc selected by Kruskal's algorithm. The function must satisfy two properties. First, the way in which divides the cost of an arc can only depend on the connected components of the network before the arc is added, and the connected components of the network after the arc is added. Second, must satisfy a path independence property. Assume that we have two networks with the same set of connected components. We add to both networks two sequences of arcs such that the sets of connected components of the new networks also coincide. The path independence condition says that the total part of the cost paid by an agent in both sequences is the same.
Let P (N 0 ) denote the set of all partitions over N 0 . Let P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m } be a generic element of P (N 0 ) such that 0 ∈ S 0 . Given P, P 0 ∈ P (N 0 ) we say that P is finer than P 0 if for each S ∈ P , there exists T ∈ P 0 such that S ⊂ T . Given P, P 0 ∈ P (N 0 ) we say that P is 1-finer than P 0 if P 0 is obtained from P joining two elements of P. Namely, if P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m } and P is 1-finer than P 0 then, there exist S k , S l ∈ P such that Kruskal (1956) define an algorithm for constructing an mt. The idea is quite simple, the mt is constructed by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest cost without introducing cycles. Formally, Kruskal's algorithm is defined as follows.
We start with A 0 (C) = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N 0 , i 6 = j} and g 0 (C) = ∅.
there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select just one. We have that
Stage p + 1. We have defined the sets A p (C) and g p (C). Take an arc
{c kl } . If there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select just one. Two cases are possible:
} has a cycle. Go to the beginning of Stage p + 1 with
This process is completed in |N | stages. We say that g |N | (C) is a tree obtained following Kruskal's algorithm. Notice that this algorithm leads to a tree, but this is not always unique.
When there is no ambiguity, we write A p , g p , and
We define a family of rules through Kruskal's algorithm. At each step of the algorithm, an arc is added to the network. Once we add the arc, we divide its cost among the agents. Let be a function specifying the part of the cost paid by each agent. Each agent will pay the sum of the costs paid in each arc selected by Kruskal's algorithm.
To each function we can associate a rule f .
. Notice that we allow to depend on many things: C, (i p , j p ) (the arc selected), p (the stage), g p−1 (the arcs already selected), and others. In this paper we concentrate on a class of functions .
A sharing function is a function associating with each pair of partitions (P, P 0 ) where P is 1-finer than P 0 , a vector (P, P 0 ) ∈ ∆ (N ) satisfying the following path independence condition.
Let P , P 0 ∈ P (N 0 ) be such that P is finer than P 0 . Assume that © P 
We can associate with each sharing function the rule f in mcstp. For each mcstp (N 0 , C) and each i ∈ N, we define
Let us give an interpretation of the sharing function . It is trivial to see that
¢ is 1-finer than P (g p ). Thus, once we add an arc to the network constructed following Kruskal's algorithm, the cost of the arc is divided among the agents taking into account the agents connected before adding the arc,
¢ , and the agents connected after adding the arc, P (g p ) . It does not matter the way in which the agents are connected and the arc we add, whenever the arc connect the same components in P ¡ g p−1
¢ . Assume that P = P (g p ) and P 0 = P (g p+q ) are as in the definition of the path independence condition of . Following Kruskal's algorithm, we can add different sequences of arcs such that starting in g p , after adding these sequence of arcs the network is g p+q . The path independence condition says that the total part of the cost paid by every agent is independent of the chosen sequence. This property is crucial in the proof of Proposition 1 below. Since Kruskal's algorithm can produce several trees, f could depend on the tree g |N| selected. Next proposition says that this is not the case.
Proposition 1. For each sharing function , f is well defined.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us consider several examples of rules f induced by sharing functions .
Example 1. Constant sharing functions.
• The sharing rule . There exists j ∈ N such that for all P, P 0 ∈ P (N 0 ) with P 1-finer than P 0 , i (P, P 0 ) = 1 if i = j and i (P, P 0 ) = 0 otherwise.
• The sharing rule . For all P, P 0 ∈ P (N 0 ) with P 1-finer than P 0 , i (P,
Example 2. The sharing rule . Let (P, P 0 ) be such that P 0 is obtained from P = {S 0 , S 1 , ..., S m } joining S k and S l . We consider two cases:
1. k > 0 and l > 0. Only agents who benefit directly when adding an arc pay for that, i.e., only agents in S k ∪ S l pay. All agents in the same group pay the same. Finally, the total amount paid by a group is proportional to the new agents to who this group is connected, i.e., agents in S k pay proportionally to |S l | and agents in S l pay proportionally to |S k | . Thus
o t h e r w i s e .
2. k or l are 0. For instance, assume that l = 0. Only the agents who benefit directly when adding an arc pay for that. All agents in the same group pay the same. Finally, since agents in S 0 are already connected to the source they don't mind if agents in S k connect to them. Thus, agents in S 0 will pay nothing. Hence,
Later we will prove that the rule f is the rule called ERO in Feltkamp et al (1994) , the P − value in Branzei et al (2004) , and ϕ in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) .
Example 3. Let w = {w i } i∈N be a weight system where w i > 0 for all i ∈ N . We define the sharing rule w as in Example 2 but now agents in the same group pay proportionally to the weights. For instance, if k > 0 and l > 0 then,
The set of rules © f w ª induced by sharing functions w as above coincides with the set of optimistic Shapley rules. These rules are studied in Lorenzo-Freire (2007a, 2007b) .
Example 4. Tijs et al (2006) introduce the family of obligation rules. Later, we prove that if f is an obligation rule, there exists a sharing function such that f = f .
The axiomatic characterization of the family
In this section we present the main result of the paper. We prove that the family of rules associated with sharing functions coincides with the set of rules satisfying a property of additivity over the cost matrix and a property of monotonicity over the cost matrix.
We say that a cost allocation rule satisfies:
and c
, we have that
RA is an additivity property restricted to some subclass of problems. No rule satisfies additivity over all mcstp. The reason is that in the definition of a rule we are claiming that P
with additivity over all mcstp. See Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006b) for a detailed discussion of RA.
SCM is called cost monotonicity in Tijs et al (2006) and solidarity in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a). Dutta and Kar (2004) introduce a property called cost monotonicity, which is different from SCM.
We now introduce a result of , which will be used later. We say that i, j ∈ S ⊂ N 0 , i 6 = j are (C, S)-connected if there exists a path g ij from i to j satisfying that for all (k, l) ∈ g ij , k, l ∈ S and c kl = 0. We say that S ⊂ N 0 is a C-component if two conditions hold. Firstly, for all i, j ∈ S, i and j are (C, S)-connected. Secondly, S is maximal, i.e., if S Ã T ⊂ N 0 there exist i, j ∈ T , i 6 = j such that i and j are not (C, T )-connected. prove that the set of C-components is a partition of N 0 .
Norde et al (2004) also prove that every mcstp can be written as a nonnegative combination of mcstp where the cost of the arcs are 0 or 1. The next lemma states this result in a little bit different way in order to adapt it to our objectives.
q=1 of cost matrices and a family {x q } m(C) q=1 of non-negative real numbers satisfying three conditions:
(2) For each q ∈ {1, . . . , m(C)}, there exists a network g q such that c
We now present our axiomatic characterization.
Theorem 1. f satisfies RA and SCM if and only if there exists a sharing function such that f = f .
We end the section by proving that the properties used in Theorem 1 are independent.
• There exist rules satisfying SCM but not RA.
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), consider the rule f such that:
It is trivial to see that f satisfies SCM.
Nevertheless, f does not satisfy RA. Consider N = {1, 2} and the following cost matrices
• There exist rules satisfying RA but not SCM.
Lorenzo-Freire and Lorenzo (2006) prove that f satisfies RA. -Puga (2006a) show that f does not satisfy SCM.
Bergantiños and Vidal
5 An alternative definition of the family Tijs et al (2006) introduce obligation rules, a family of cost allocation rules for mcstp. They prove that obligation rules satisfy SCM. Lorenzo-Freire and Lorenzo (2006) prove that obligation rules satisfy RA. By Theorem 1, obligation rules are rules induced by sharing functions. Obligation rules are defined through obligation functions in the following way. Given an obligation function o we can associate an obligation rule f o . The set of obligation rules is the set {f o : o is an obligation function}. We define generalized obligation functions. Applying the same ideas as in Tijs et al (2006) , for each generalized obligation function θ, we define the rule f θ . The main result of this section says that the set of rules associated with sharing functions coincides with the set of rules associated with generalized obligation functions. Tijs et al (2006) define obligation rules through a matrix called the contribution matrix. They also mention that obligation rules can be obtained through Kruskal's algorithm. We present the definition of obligation rules through Kruskal's algorithm in order to adapt it to the interests of this paper.
Given N ⊂ N , an obligation function for N is a map o that assigns to each S ∈ 2 N0 \ {∅} a vector o(S) ∈ R S satisfying the following conditions. For each
Tijs et al (2006) associate an obligation rule f o with each obligation function o. The idea is as follows. At each stage of Kruskal's algorithm an arc (i p , j p ) is added to the network. The cost of this arc will be paid by the agents who benefit from the construction of this arc.
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), let g |N| be a tree obtained applying Kruskal's algorithm 
where (i p , j p ) and g p are obtained through Kruskal's algorithm. Tijs et al (2006) prove that f o is an allocation rule in mcstp, i.e., it does not depend on the chosen mt g |N | .
We define a generalized obligation function as a map θ : P (N 0 ) → R N satisfying three conditions:
We now prove that obligation functions can be considered as a subset of generalized obligation functions.
Given an obligation function o, P ∈ P (N ), and i ∈ S ∈ P, we define θ o :
Proposition 2. θ o is a generalized obligation function. Proof. See Appendix.
Given a partition P ∈ P (N ) and i ∈ S ∈ P, if o is an obligation function o i only depends on S. Nevertheless if θ is a generalized obligation function, θ i depends on S but also on the rest of the agents (N \S) . Thus, we can think in obligation functions as the subset of generalized obligation functions where there is not externalities.
We say that f is a generalized obligation rule if there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that for all i ∈ N ,
In this case we denote f = f θ and we say that f θ is the generalized obligation rule associated with the generalized obligation function θ.
We now prove that the set of generalized obligation rules coincides with the set of rules associated with sharing functions.
Axiomatic characterizations of Obligation rules
Adding some properties to the ones used in Theorem 1, we can obtain characterizations of other rules. We firsrt consider two properties: Core selection (the rule is in the core of the problem) and separability (if there are no savings when two groups of agents connect jointly, agents must pay the same when they connect jointly or separately). We have characterized the rules satisfying RA and SCM. The main result of this section says that if we add core selection or separability to RA and SCM, we have a characterization of obligation rules. If we add symmetry to the previous characterizations of obligation rules we obtain a unique rule, the rule of Example 2.
We say that f satisfies:
Note that this definition is equivalent to say that f (N 0 , C) belongs to the core of (N, v C ).
Two subset of agents, S and N \ S, can connect to the source separately or can connect jointly. If there are no savings when they connect jointly, SEP says that agents must pay the same in both circumstances.
This property appears in Megiddo (1978) , Granot and Huberman (1981) , and Granot and Maschler (1998) . They use the name decomposition, instead of separability, and study its relation with the core and the nucleolus of (N, v C ) . Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) call it separability.
We now present the characterization of obligation rules.
Theorem 2. (a) f satisfies RA, SCM, and CS if and only if f is an obligation rule.
(b) f satisfies RA, SCM, and SEP if and only if f is an obligation rule.
In Appendix we prove that the properties used in Theorems 2 (a) and (b) are independent.
Lorenzo-Freire and Lorenzo (2006) characterize obligation rules as the unique rules satisfying RA and P M. Thus, under RA, P M is a strong property. If a rule satisfies P M (and RA) it also satisfies SCM. This result is not true in general, there exist rules satisfying P M but failing SCM (see Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) ). Feltkamp et al (1994) introduce the Equal Remaining Obligation Rule (ERO) in mcstp. This rule is studied later in Branzei et al (2004) and in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a , 2006b , 2006c . As a corollary of Theorem 2 we can give two axiomatic characterizations of this rule.
We say that i, j ∈ N are symmetric if for all k ∈ N 0 \ {i, j}, c ik = c jk . We say that f satisfies Symmetry (SY M) if for all mcstp (N 0 , C) and all pair of symmetric agents i, j ∈ N ,
Corollary 1. (a) ERO is the unique rule satisfying RA, SCM, CS, and SY M.
(b) ERO is the unique rule satisfying RA, SCM, SEP, and SY M.
The properties used in Corollary 1 could not be independent. For instance, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006b) prove that ERO is the unique rule satisfying RA, SEP, and SY M.
Appendix
We prove several results stated in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1
Given a tree t = {(i p , j p )} |N | p=1 obtained following Kruskal's algorithm and i ∈ N , we define
We prove that f ,t (N 0 , C) does not depend on the mt t chosen. For each tree t obtained following Kruskal's algorithm we define recursively the following:
• c 1 (t) = min
• In general, c p (t) = min
This process ends when we find m(t) ≤ |N | such that ∪ m(t)−1 p=0
Consider two trees t
p=1 constructed according to Kruskal's algorithm. We prove, by induction, that c q (t 1 ) = c q (t 2 ) = c q and
• q = 1. By Kruskal algorithm we know that c 1 (t 1 ) = c 1 (t 2 ) = c 1 = min {c kl : k, l ∈ N 0 , k 6 = l}. Next we prove that P (B 1 (t 1 )) = P ({(i, j) : c ij ≤ c 1 }) (the proof for P (B 1 (t 2 )) is similar and we omit it).
Since
Then, there exist S, S 0 ∈ P (B 1 (t 1 )), S 6 = S 0 , k ∈ S, and l ∈ S 0 such that c kl ≤ c 1 . Thus, B 1 (t 1 ) ∪ {(k, l)} has no cycles and (k, l) / ∈ t 1 , which contradicts the construction of t 1 following Kruskal's algorithm. Then,
• Suppose that c r (t 1 ) = c r (t 2 ) = c r and
r }) for all r < q.
• Case q. Suppose that c q (t 1 ) < c q (t 2 ) (the case c q (t 1 ) > c q (t 2 ) is similar and we omit it). Consider (i, j) ∈ t 1 such that c ij = c q (t 1 ). We know that ∪ Next we prove that
) is similar and we omit it). Clearly,
} has no cycles and (k, l) / ∈ t 1 , which contradicts the construction of t 1 following Kruskal's algorithm. Then,
As direct consequences of this result we have that m(t 1 ) = m (t 2 ) = m and |B q (t 1 )| = |B q (t 2 )| for all q = 0, . . . , m. Therefore,
Similarly, we can prove that
For all q = 0, 1, ..., m,
Since satisfies the path independence condition, for all q = 1, ..., m 
Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove that for each sharing function , f satisfies RA and SCM.
Let (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C 0 ) be two mcstp as in the definition of RA. It is well known that each mt could be obtained through Kruskal's algorithm. Thus,
. Because of the definition of Kruskal's algorithm we can proceed in such a way that for all p = 1, ...., |N | ,
Thus, f satisfies RA.
Next we prove that f satisfies SCM . We must prove that Assume that there exists an mt t in (N 0 , C) such that (i, j) / ∈ t. Thus, t is also an mt in (N 0 , C 0 ). Since any mt can be obtained through Kruskal's algorithm and Proposition 1, we have that
Assume that (i, j) ∈ t for every mt t in the problem (N 0 , C). Consider: G the set of trees that do not involve arc (i, j),t = arg min t∈G c(N 0 , C, t), and x = c(N 0 , C,t) − m(N 0 , C). We distinguish two cases:
(a) r = r 0 . Thus, for all p ∈ {1, . . . , |N |},
(b) r 0 > r (the case r 0 < r is not possible because of the definition of Kruskal's algorithm). In this case the selection of arc (i, j) in (N 0 , C 0 ) is delayed, with respect to (N 0 , C) , from the stage r to the stage r 0 . Formally,
We define a collection of cost matrices {C q } r 0 −r q=0 where each C q is given by
and c q kl = c kl when (k, l) 6 = (i, j) for all q = 0, . . . , r 0 − r − 1.
It is easy to see that C q and C q+1 satisfy the conditions of case (a) .
Consider the cost matrices C Therefore,
Consider the mcstp problems (N 0 , C 1 ) and (N 0 , C 2 ) where:
Thus,t is an mt in (N 0 , C 1 ), (N 0 , C 2 ) and (N 0 , C 1 + C 2 ) = (N 0 , C 0 ). It is trivial to see that (N 0 , C 1 ) and (N 0 , C 2 ) satisfy the conditions of the definition of RA.
. By definition of f , we have that f i (N 0 , C 2 ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Since C 1 and C satisfy the conditions of Case 1,
We have proved that f satisfies SCM.
We now prove the reciprocal. Consider a cost allocation rule f which satisfies RA and SCM . We prove that f = f for some sharing function .
Given P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m } ∈ P (N 0 ), we define the mcstp (N 0 , C P ) where c P ij = 0 if i, j ∈ S k for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m} and c
where P is 1-finer than P 0 , we define
Next we prove that is a sharing function:
1. Assume that P is 1-finer than P 0 . We prove that (P, P 0 ) ∈ ∆ (N ) .
(a) Since P is 1-finer than
2. We prove that satisfies the path independence condition. Assume that © P 
Analogously, we can prove that
We have proved that is a sharing function. We now prove that f = f .
are defined as in Lemma 1. We now prove that for all mcstp (N 0 , C) and all x ≥ 0, f(N 0 , xC) = xf (N 0 , C) and f (N 0 , xC) = xf (N 0 , C). We only prove it for f . The proof for f is similar and we omit it.
We distinguish three cases:
• x ∈ Q + , i.e., x = p q with p, q ∈ N. Applying the case above,
• x ∈ (R\Q) + . We know that there exists a sequence {x p } p∈N with x p ∈ Q + , 0 < x p < x for all p ∈ N, and lim
Following a similar argument to the one used to show that is positive, we obtain that f (N 0 , (x − x p )C) is non-negative. Therefore, for all i ∈ N,
To conclude the proof, it is enough to prove that f (N 0 , C) = f (N 0 , C) where C is such that there exists a network g with c ij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ g and c ij = 0 otherwise.
Let P = {S r } m r=0 be the partition of N 0 in C-components. If we apply Kruskal's algorithm to (N 0 , C), we can obtain the mt g |N| =
• For all p = 1, . . . , |N | − m, c i p j p = 0 and {i p , j p } ⊂ S r with r ∈ {0, ..., m} .
• For all p = |N | − m + 1, . . . , |N | , c i p j p = 1, i p = 0, and j p ∈ T p−|N |+m .
Let (N 0 , C P ) be the mcstp defined as above. It can be easily proved that
By definition, c
Proof of Proposition 2
We prove that θ o satisfies the three conditions of the definition of a generalized obligation function.
Since o(S) ∈ ∆(S) for all S ⊂ N and o i (S) = 0 for all i ∈ S such that 0 ∈ S we conclude that 3. Consider P, P 0 ∈ P (N 0 ) such that P is finer than P 0 and i ∈ N . Thus, θ o i (P ) = o i (S) where i ∈ S ∈ P . Since P is finer that P 0 , there exists T ∈ P 0 such that i ∈ S ⊂ T . Therefore,
Proof of Proposition 3
" ⊂ " Let f θ be such that θ is a generalized obligation function. Given P, P 0 ∈ P (N 0 ) where P is 1-finer than P 0 , we define
(a) Since P is finer than P 0 and θ is a generalized obligation function,
We have proved that is a sharing function. It is trivial to see that f θ = f .
Let f be such that is a sharing function. Let P = {S 0 , S 1 , ..., S m } ∈ P (N ). There exists a sequence {P 0 , P 1, ..., P m } ⊂ P (N 0 ) such that P 0 = P, P m = {N 0 } , and for all q = 1, ..., m, P q−1 is 1-finer than P q . Notice that this sequence may not be unique.
We define
Since satisfies the path independence condition, θ (P ) does not depend on the sequence {P 0 , ..., P m } . Thus, θ (P ) is well defined.
We now prove that θ is a generalized obligation function.
1. Since i (P, P 0 ) ≥ 0 for all P, P 0 ∈ P (N ) with P 1-finer than P 0 and all i ∈ N, we deduce that θ i (P ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
2.
X i∈N
3. Assume that P is finer than P 0 = {S 0 0 , ..., S 0 m 0 } . Then, m 0 ≤ m and there exists a sequence {P 0 , P 1, ..., P m } ⊂ P (N 0 ) such that P 0 = P, P m = {N 0 } , for all q = 1, ..., m P q−1 is 1 finer than P q , and P m−m 0 = P 0 . Thus, given i ∈ N,
Now,
We have proved that θ is a generalized obligation function. We now prove that f θ = f . By (1) we have that if P is 1-finer than P 0 and i ∈ N, then
Now it is trivial to see that f θ = f .
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Proof of Theorem 2
(a) We first prove that obligation rules satisfy the three properties. LorenzoFreire and Lorenzo (2006) prove that obligation rules satisfy RA. Tijs et al (2006) prove that obligation rules satisfy SCM and Population Monotonicity (P M). Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) prove that P M implies CS.
Assume that f satisfies RA, SCM, and CS. We prove that there exists an obligation function o such that f = f o . By Theorem 1, there exists a sharing function such that f (N 0 , C) = f (N 0 , C). By the proof of Theorem 1, if P is 1-finer than P 0 , then (P,
By Proposition 3, there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that f (N 0 , C) = f θ (N 0 , C). By the proof of Proposition 3, given P = {S 0 , ..., S m } ∈ P (N 0 ),
where P 0 = P and P m = {N 0 } . Thus,
In the proof of Theorem 1 we have proved that if f satisfies RA and SCM,
Thus, f = f θ where for all P ∈ P (N 0 ) and all i ∈ N , θ i (P ) = f i (N 0 , C P ). Given P ∈ P (N 0 ) with i ∈ S ∈ P , we define P S = {S, {j} j∈N0\S } ∈ P (N 0 ).
Let us define the map o that assigns to each S ∈ 2 N \{∅} the vector o(S) ∈ R S such that o i (S) = θ i (P S ) for all i ∈ S. We prove that o is an obligation function.
• o i (S) = θ i (P S ) ≥ 0 and
Thus, o(S) ∈ ∆(S) when 0 / ∈ S. Moreover, when 0 ∈ S, o i (S) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
• Let i ∈ S ⊂ T . Clearly, P S is finer than P T . Therefore,
We now prove that
Given a partition P ∈ P (N 0 ) remember that S(P, i) denotes the element of the partition P to which agent i belongs to. Thus,
(b) We know that obligation rules satisfy RA, SCM, and P M. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) prove that P M implies SEP .
Consider an allocation rule f satisfying RA, SCM, and SEP . Using similar arguments to those used in (a), we can conclude that there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that f = f θ . Moreover, for all
Using similar arguments to those used in (a), it can be proved that the map o assigning to each S ∈ 2 N \{∅} the vector o(S) = θ(P S ) is an obligation function and f = f o .
Independence of the properties in Theorem 2
We prove that the properties used in Theorem 2 (a) and (b) are independent. We will do the following: (i) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and SCM but fails CS and SEP. Thus, CS is independent of RA and SCM in part (a) . Moreover, SEP is independent of RA and SCM in part (b) .
(ii) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and CS but fails SCM. Thus, SCM is independent of RA and CS in part (a).
(iii) We define a rule f which satisfies SCM, CS, and SEP but fails RA. Thus, RA is independent of SCM and CS in part (a). Moreover, RA is independent of SCM and SEP in part (b) .
(iv) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and SEP but fails SCM. Thus, SCM is independent of RA and SEP in part (b).
Proof of (i) .
Let f be the egalitarian rule, i.e.,
It is trivial to see that f satisfies RA and SCM. Nevertheless, f does not satisfy SEP and CS. Consider the mcstp (N 0 , C), where N = {1, 2} and
Proof of (ii) .
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and an mt t, Bird (1976) defined the minimal network (N 0 , C t ) associated with t as follows:
{c kl }, where g ij denotes the unique path in t from i to j. It is well known that the minimal network is independent of the mt t chosen. Thus, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) define the irreducible form (N 0 , C * ) of an mcstp (N 0 , C) as the minimal network (N 0 , C t ) associated with some mt t. We define a decomposition of C * in the conditions of Lemma 1. Let us clarify the decomposition in the next example. 
Since C * is an irreducible network, there are at most |N | different costs in C * . Thus, m (C * ) ≤ |N | and hence, i q is well defined for all q = 1, . . . , m(C * ).
, and for all q = 2, . . . , m(C * ),
Moreover, for all q = 1, . . . , m(C * ), C * q is given by
It is trivial to see that
x q C * q and that the decomposition satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1. Let f o be the obligation rule associated with the obligation function
We define f in the following way:
where
The proof of (ii) is a consequence of the following claims. Claim 1. f satisfies CS. Claim 2. f satisfies RA. Claim 3. f does not satisfy SCM.
Two cases are possible:
1. Assume that c * q ij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N and c * q Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006b) prove that if C, C 0 , and C + C 0 satisfy the conditions of the definition of RA, then v (C+C 0 )
in the conditions of the definition of RA. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006b) prove that (C + C 0 ) * = C * + C 0 * . We say that a matrix C is irreducible if C = C * . Since f only depends on the irreducible matrix, we assume that C, C 0 , and C + C 0 are irreducible. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) prove that (N 0 , C) is irreducible if and only if there exists an mt t π in (N 0 , C) satisfying two conditions:
Given an mt t in an irreducible problem (N 0 , C), Bergantiños and VidalPuga (2006a) define a procedure for associating an mt t π satisfying (A1) and (A2) .
Let t = {(i 0 , i)} i∈N be the mt for the three mcstp given by the definition of RA. Since t is an mt in (N 0 , C), (N 0 , C 0 ) and (N 0 , C + C 0 ), applying the procedure of Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) it is straightforward to prove that there exists an mt t π in (N 0 , C), (N 0 , C 0 ) and (N 0 , C + C 0 ) satisfying (A1) and (A2) . Moreover, we can order the cost of the arcs of t π in the same way in the three problems. Namely, there exist an order π 0 of the agents satisfying
We say that an mcstp (N 0 , C) satisfies the property P RO if in the decomposition of f there is no C * q satisfying that c * q ij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N and c * q
. We distinguish three cases:
Thus, (N 0 , C), (N 0 , C 0 ) and (N 0 , C + C 0 ) satisfies P RO. In this case we know that
Since all the problems obtained in the decomposition of (N 0 , C), (N 0 , C 0 ) and (N 0 , C + C 0 ) satisfy the conditions of the definition of RA and f o satisfies RA,
o is similar and we omit it.
Thus, (N 0 , C) does not satisfy P RO and (N 0 , C 0 ) satisfies P RO. Because of the existence of the order π 0 , we deduce that c 0π 1 + c
Let us define e C as:
Applying the decomposition to C,
Analogously, since (N 0 , C + C 0 ) does not satisfy P RO,
Moreover,
Because of the existence of the order π 0 ,
Hence, x * m(C+C
Therefore,
Then,
Since all the problems obtained in the decomposition of (N 0 , C), (N 0 , C 0 ) and (N 0 , C + C 0 ) satisfy the conditions of the definition of RA and f
Thus, (N 0 , C), (N 0 , C 0 ), and (N 0 , C + C 0 ) do not satisfy P RO.
Using similar arguments as in Case 2 we can prove that
, and
and hence, x * m(C+C
Proof of Claim 3. Consider the following example. N = {1, 2, 3} and C such that c ij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N and c 0i = 1 for all i ∈ N . Let C 0 be such 
Proof of (iii) . Bergantiños and Kar (2007) prove that there exists a rule f which satisfies SCM and P M but fails a property called Cone-wise positive linearity (CP L) .
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006a) prove that P M implies SEP and CS. Thus, f also satisfies SEP and CS.
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2006b) prove that RA implies CP L. Thus, f does not satisfy RA.
Proof of (iv) .
Let u be a function assigning to each S ∈ 2 N 0 \ {∅} a vector u(S) ∈ R S satisfying the following conditions. For each S ∈ 2 N 0 \ {∅} such that 0 / ∈ S, P i∈S u i (S) = 1. For each S ∈ 2 N0 \ {∅} such that 0 ∈ S, u i (S) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
By convinience we take u i (∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N. We can associate with each function u a rule f u in mcstp as in the case of an obligation rule f o associated with an obligation function o. Namely, given an mcstp (N 0 , C), let g |N | be a tree obtained applying Kruskal's algorithm to
The proof of (iv) is a consequence of the following claims. Claim 1. f u is well defined for all u. Claim 2. f u satisfies RA for all u. Claim 3. f u satisfies SEP for all u. Claim 4. f u does not satisfy SCM for some u.
Proof of Claim 1.
We have seen that we can associate with each obligation function a generalized obligation function θ. Moreover, with each generalized obligation function we can associate a sharing function . If we employ the same procedure, but starting with u instead of o, we can associate a function ψ with u.
It is easy to see that this function ψ also satisfies the path independence property. Moreover, for each P, P 0 ∈ P (N ) such that P is 1-finer than P 0 , we have that P i∈N ψ i (P, P 0 ) = 1.
We can associate with each function ψ a rule f ψ in the same way than we associate f with each sharing function . Moreover, f u = f ψ . Using arguments similar to those used in Proposition 1, we can prove that f ψ is well defined. ¥ Proof of Claim 2. In Theorem 1 we have proved that f satisfies RA. Using arguments similar to those used in Theorem 1 for f we can prove that f u satisfies RA. ¥ Proof of Claim 3. Consider an mcstp (N 0 , C) and
p=1 such that:
• The order in which we select the arcs, following Kruskal's algorithm, is the same in m (T 0 , C), m ((N \ T ) 0 , C) , and (N 0 , C) . Namely, given
We now prove that for each arc (i * , j * ) ∈ t T ∪ t N \T the way in which its cost c i * j * is divided among the agents is the same when (i * , j * ) is selected by Kruskal's algorithm applied to (N 0 , C) than when (i * , j * ) is selected in Kruskal's algorithm applied to (T 0 , C) (when (i * , j * ) ∈ t T ) or ((N \ T ) 0 , C) (when (i * , j * ) ∈ t N \T ). Let (i * , j * ) ∈ t T (the case (i * , j * ) ∈ t N \T is similar and we omit it). Thus, We prove that for all i ∈ N,
¢¢ −u i (S (P (g p (T )) , i)) = u i (∅)−u i (∅) = 0. Notice that agents in N \T pay nothing in m (T 0 , C) .
We know that g i´´= 0.
Thus, i ∈ T. Assume, without loss of generality, that i ∈ S ¡ P ¡ g p−1 (T ) ¢ , i * ¢ . Therefore,
, i´, and
i´.
Hence, the result holds.
Thus, i ∈ T. Assume, without loss of generality, that i ∈ S ¡ P ¡ g p−1 (T ) ¢ , i * ¢ . We consider two cases: Thus, the result holds. This finishes the proof of (a) . The proof of (b) is similar and we omit it.
